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A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is considered one of the most important techniques used to propagate trust in authentication
over the Internet. Qis technology is based on a trust model deZned by the original X.509 (1988) standard and is composed of
three entities: the certiZcation authority (CA), the certiZcate holder (or subject), and the Relying Party (RP). Qe CA plays the
role of a trusted third party between the certiZcate holder and the RP. In many use cases, this trust model has worked successfully.
However, we argue that the application of this model on the Internet implies that web users need to depend on almost anyone in the
world in order to use PKI technology. Qus, we believe that the current TLS system is not Zt for purpose and must be revisited as a
whole. In response, the latest dra` edition of X.509 has proposed a new trust model by adding new entity called the Trust Broker
(TB). In this paper, we present an implementation approach that a Trust Broker could follow in order to give RPs trust information
about a CA by assessing the quality of its issued certiZcates. Qis is related to the quality of the CA’s policies and procedures and
its commitment to them. Finally, we present our Trust Broker implementation that demonstrates how RPs can make informed
decisions about certiZcate holders in the context of the global web, without requiring large processing resources themselves.
1. Introduction
Qe need to identify our partners on the Internet constitutes
one of the major challenges in ensuring trust on the Internet.
However, multiple recent stories show that such an objective
is far from being reached.
On the 18th of February 2015, a security expert published
an image on Twitter [1] showing that SuperZsh is delivering
the certiZcate of Bank of America, instead of Verisign
(Figure 1). Supposedly, Lenovo integrated SuperZsh so`ware
in some of its PC models, in order to inject advertisements
related to Google search results for users of IE and Chrome
web browsers. Doing this, SuperZsh can in fact intercept any
encrypted trahc of Lenovo users. To solve this issue, Lenovo
has issued a guide that helps users to remove SuperZsh [2].
In a similarway andmore recently (Nov 23, 2015), another
security expert showed how Dell has shipped computers that
make their future owners vulnerable to MITM attacks [3].
He showed that Dell has injected a root CA called eDellRoot
in two models of PCs along with its private key. Qe expert
explained that anyone could extract the private key and use it
to sign falsiZed certiZcates that will be accepted transparently
by the Dell PCs having the eDellRoot CA. Dell has provided
an ohcial solution to remove the root CA as well as its private
key [4].
In both stories, the solution is to remove the CA and/or
so`ware from the concerned computers. However, nothing
prevents similar stories appearing again in the future, and
these are not even malicious attacks. Qere are many more
examples of these; for example, Ye et al. [5] have shown how
Figure 1: Bank of America’s certiZcate signed by SuperZsh instead
of Verisign.
malicious web sites can trick users into believing they have a
secure SSL session when they do not.
On the other hand, many other stories in the news show
that direrent CAs have either abused the trust that RPs
have in them or their systems have been hacked to issue
false certiZcates. For example, in June 2011, DigiNotar, a
Dutch CA, was hacked. Qe hackers made DigiNotar sign
hundreds of falsiZed certiZcates for high proZle websites such
as Google and Facebook. One year a`er, DigiNotar declared
bankruptcy. Other stories showed how CAs have abused
the trust of RPs. For example, on 23 March, 2015, Google
discovered that China Internet Network Information Center
(CNNIC) issued an unconstrained intermediate certiZcate to
an Egyptian company that used this certiZcate to intercept
communications of web users accessingGoogle domains (i.e.,
a TLS MITM attack).
We believe that the main problem of the web TLS system
comes from the fact that web users must trust a multitude of
entities in order to secure their transactions. First of all, they
must trust their web browsers to validateweb sites’ certiZcates
on behalf of them. Trusting the certiZcate validators is not
limited to known web browsers because anyone has the right
to validate certiZcates on behalf of web users or trick users
into believing validation has occurred. Secondly, the same
web user has to trust directly hundreds of unknown CAs
provided by direrent OS/browser editors, because the latter
does not want to assume any responsibilities if something
goes wrong with any CA. In order to justify these bold
statements, we Zrst need to list the obligations [6] ofweb users
before they should accept a public key certiZcate:
(1) Users should ensure the authenticity of the trust
anchor or “root” CA (i.e., ensure that the public key
of the CA belongs to the claimed CA).
(2) Users should trust the trust anchor CA to issue
certiZcates.
(3) Users should know that the subject’s certiZcate is
appropriate to the context of use.
(4) Users should ensure that the subject’s certiZcate is
valid, as well as all the certiZcates in the chain up
to the trust anchor’s certiZcate or public key (i.e.,
conform to the right standards).
To realize task 1, web users must get the certiZcate of a
“root” CA from a trusted source or by some out of band
means. According to RFC 5280, web users are supposed
to build their trust decisions (task 2) by analysing a set
of CA documents (CertiZcate Policy (CP) and CertiZcation
Practice Statement (CPS)) to answermany technical and legal
questions like what happens when the CA does not correctly
check the identity of the certiZcate holder, or worse, when
it issues a certiZcate to a person with a false identity? What
happens if the certiZcate is false and makes me lose $1000? Is
the CA responsible? [7]. Executing the validation obligation
(task 4) is impossible for human users. Consequently, except
for task 3, no user is able to realize these tasks and must be
aided by trustworthy so`warewith trustworthy conZguration
data. It should be noted that all these tasks must be executed
when in fact most of users do not have any knowledge
about what certiZcation authorities are and, furthermore,
when they are in the middle of performing some much
more important application task (such as making a purchase
on the Internet). Qis was demonstrated through several
experimental studies [8–11].
Qus, web users must depend on other entities to help
them achieve these obligations. We use the term recom-
mender for those entities who provide the so`ware and
conZguration data. Web browsers are one of the best known
examples that users may use. Qree categories of recom-
menders can be distinguished; the Zrst category proposes
only to realize the validation obligation (task 4) and partially
task 3 by checking the key usage Zeld, such asChrome,Opera,
and IE. Qe second category realizes tasks 1 and 2, such as
Microso` andApple by distributing trust CA lists in their OS.
Qe third category implements tasks 1, 2, 3 (partially), and 4
on behalf of users, such as Firefox.
While the aforementioned examples of recommenders
are known entities, no countermeasure exists that may limit
the dependence of web users on other unknown entities.
For example, any unknown mobile application developer
may also realize the aforementioned obligations on behalf
of smartphone web users (how many unknown web clients
exist on AppStore and GooglePlay stores?). Additionally,
many mobile applications integrate embedded browsers into
their primary services, like the Facebook application. All
these kinds of recommenders may expose (intentionally or
not) web users to MITM attacks. Finally, any computer
manufacturer may also manipulate the list of CAs (realizing
tasks 1 and 2) before shipping the computers to their clients
(e.g., Dell).
Trusting direrent lists of CAs (trust list) provided by
direrent OS/browser editors can make the web users con-
fused. Indeed for the same website, a web user may get
direrent responses depending on the application (IE, FF, and
Chrome)/platform (Windows, Linux, and Android) adopted
by the user to access the website. On one hand the list of CAs
is direrent from one application/platform to another. On the
other hand, the quality of the validation process depends on
the understanding of the application/platform developer to
??
Figure 2: Web users dependence on almost anyone for validating
certiZcates.
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Figure 3: Current trust model for web users.
the related standards, even when the latter may not be clear
about direrent points of validation [12].
From the trust point of view, the relation between the web
user and the recommenders is constructed on an unconscious
basis. Indeed, users are primarily concerned with their task
in hand (Internet surZng, social network, FTP client, buying
a computer, etc.) and they believe that no harm will come
to them when accepting the services of their recommenders.
We call this kind of relation unconscious trust (see Figures 2
and 3). Qis is in direct contrast to the relationship between
the certiZcate subject and their issuing CA. In this case the
subject has made a conscious decision to trust a particular CA
and has cemented this trust by paying the CA a fee for their
certiZcate.
In real life, all of us make unconscious trust decisions
to handle the complexity of our world [13]. For example,
we cross the streets without caring about car drivers and
we go to the street without carrying Zrearms. In this case,
our unconscious trust is justiZed by the rarity of bad events.
However, this unconscious trust transforms to conscious
trust only when the frequency of bad events increases. Qis
supposes that humans are able to detect the dangers and bad
events. However, on the Internet users are unable to detect
these problems; they depend on experts to detect them and
inform them. Clearly, web users on the Internet will continue
to depend unconsciously on the services of unknown entities.
Qe major risk of this kind of relation is that the uncon-
scious trust in recommenders is usually transformed into
unconditional trust that gives the recommenders complete
discretionary power over the web users.
Qus, the repeated attacks happening every day come
from the fact that web users trust almost everyone in the
world to validate the X.509 certiZcates they receive. Qis fact
leads us to ask the question: “what is the beneDt of a PKI if in
the end we need to trust almost everyone in the world, in order
to be able to use it?” We believe that the current management
of thewebTLS system is broken and that PKIwith the current
management model is not Zt for purpose.
Direrent programmes have been proposed to improve
the current web TLS system (e.g., CertiZcate Transparency
[14, 15], Sovereign Keys [16], and Public Key Pinning [17]).
While those programmes prove the deZciency of the current
web TLS system, they only partially handle the problems
of the current TLS system. For example, the CertiZcate
Transparency programme of Google proposes a public online
monitoring and auditing system. Qe objective is to bring
transparency to certiZcate issuing so that a web user can
detect in real time any fake certiZcate. Qe success of this
ambitious programme depends on the participation of all
TLS system stakeholders (OS providers, CAs, web browsers,
and domain owners). Currently only Google Chrome and
CAs that are issuing EV certiZcates are included in this
programme. Ultimately, this will help web users uniquely
to realize task 1, but not the other tasks. Qus, this kind
of solution increases the dependency of web users on other
unknown entities who are partially handling the web users’
needs.
It is important to consider the current TLS system
as a whole, which is built on the benevolence of all the
recommenders between the certiZcate subject and the web
user. We believe that providing end-to-end security between
certiZcate subjects and web users begins by the identiZcation
of all the responsibilities of all the recommenders intervening
between web users and certiZcate subjects. Qe current web
TLS system must be improved to remove any source of
confusion for web users. Qe PKI industry soon realized that
the PGP approach for distributing public keys would not
work erectively or ehciently on the Internet. Havingmultiple
recommenders in PKI is moving nearer to the PGP trust
model. Entities that are providing the obligations of web users
should not be computer programs provided by any unknown
entity in the world.
Originally, X.509 was based on the 3-cornered trust
model (see Figure 4): the certiZcation authority (CA), the
certiZcate holder (or subject), and the Relying Party (RP). In
a previous paper [18], we have shown that the original X.509
trust model is not suhcient for the Internet. We proposed
thus to add a new role of Trust Broker (TB) to the original
X.509 trust model (see Figure 5). Qe TB is independent of
CAs and plays the roles of both technical and legal expert
Relying party
(RP)
Certi-cate holder
Certi-cation
authority
(CA)
Indirect contractual relation
Direct contractual relation
X.509
Figure 4: Original X.509 trust model.
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Figure 5: Qe new X.509 trust model.
for helping the RPs (web users). By explicitly adding this
role to the original X.509 trust model, the task of RPs is
simpliZed, and the responsibility of the entity acting as a Trust
Broker can be formally engaged. From the user’s point of
view, whatever number of platforms and applications they
may use to access a website, they will always get the same
recommendation from their contracted TB to help them
make an informed decision.
It should be noted that assessing the trustworthiness of
a Trust Broker is much simpler than assessing the trustwor-
thiness of all Internet based CAs. Firstly, RPs only need to
assess their trust in a single TB who will then help them
decide about all certiZcates from all CAs. Secondly, RPs will
have a contractual agreement with their chosen TB, based on
local contract law, rather than having to rely on the many
direrent national contracts laws employed by the existing
CAs. In essence, choosing a TB will be similar to choosing
an insurance policy, which users are already familiar with.
Our contributions to the problem of trust management
for PKIs are multiple. In [19], we clearly identiZed the reasons
behind the interoperability problems of PKIs.Qis has helped
us to understand the root causes behind the failure of PKIs on
the Internet (open PKI deployment model). In [18], we have
proposed to formally extend the original X.509 trust model,
by adding the TB entity.Qis newmodel is now incorporated
in the eighth edition of the X.509 standard [20].
In [21], we proposed to quantify the quality of cer-
tiZcate (QoCER) to allow RPs to make a decision about
the certiZcate. Qe QoCER score is calculated based on
the evaluation of the procedures announced by the CAs
and their commitment to apply them. Qe QoCER value is
completed by another parameter, called the quality of control
(QoCTRL), which states the degree of conZdence on the
value QoCER. Although, the couple (QoCER and QoCTRL)
can represent the information sent by the TB to the RP, this
calculation model surers from multiple issues.
Issue A.Qe calculation of CAs’ reputations is subject to collu-
sion attack. Some recommenders (in particular unknownRPs
and certiZcate holders) can collude to improve the reputation
of CAs or inversely to incriminate well-behaved CAs.
Issue B.Qis calculationmodel does not describe precisely the
aggregation and the collection approaches of recommenda-
tions.
Issue C.Qe calculationmodel does not address the scalability
issue.Qis work does not help the TB entity to evaluate a large
number of CAs in a reasonable time.
Issue D. Finally, this work was theoretical only. We did not
study the issues related to users’ decision-making process.
Qe calculation proposed in [21] faces these issues because
the four-cornered trust model was not deZned at that time,
and the problem of PKI interoperability was not clearly
expressed.
In this article, we improve our original calculationmodel.
Qe maturity that we gained from the PKI interoperability
issue and from the 4-cornered trust model has allowed us to
come up with a list of requirements that any trust calculation
modelmust conform to.Qese requirements are independent
from any trust calculation methods. In addition, we enhance
our calculation model to comply with these requirements, in
particular:
(1) Qis new calculation model addresses the problem
of collusion attack (issue A) by deZning two groups
of recommenders: identiZable recommenders and
unknown recommenders.Qe recommendations sent
by identiZed entities can be automatically accepted
but weighted according to the degree that the TB
service believes in their recommendations. However,
the TB must validate the recommendations provided
by unidentiZed entities before being accepted. Qis
increases the reliability in the calculation. Equations
(5) and (8) have been updated in Section 4.2.2 to
implement this issue.
(2) We add a preparation stage (Section 4.2.1) to the
calculation of CAs’ reputation to copewith the second
issue (issue B). Qe TB entity can set the types of
recommenders, the collection method (automatic,
manual, etc.), and the types of recommendations
(positive or negative) for each trust factor.
(3) Qe scalability issue (issue C) is handled by proposing
a semiautomatic evaluation process (cf. Figure 7).Qe
process is designed to be open to allow TB services to
deal with direrent kinds of CAs’ policies and to avoid
refusing CAs because of interoperability issues.
(4) Finally, we have implemented this calculation model
to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal in the
context of the web (Section 5). Qis implementation
highlighted some drawbacks in the original theoreti-
cal model in decision-making process (issue D). We
improve this point by (i) sending contextual infor-
mation to the RPs so that they can make informed
decisions about certiZcates and (ii) returning only one
quality value instead of two.
Qe rest of this document is structured as follows: Section 2
presents the existing trust building approaches that may help
RPs to make informed decisions about certiZcates. We show
that none of these approaches can be applied ehciently to
help RPs with unknown CAs, so in Section 3 we present
our uniZed approach along with a set of trust evaluation
criteria that any erective trust building approach must fulZl.
Section 4 presents our trust calculation model and we show
how it satisZes the criteria. In Section 5wepresent a prototype
implementation demonstrating how Internet users (RPs) can
make informed decisions about web server certiZcates. In
Section 6, we show how the 4-cornered trust model can
improve the security of web users. Finally, in Section 7, we
present our conclusions and proposed future work.
2. Existing Approaches to Building Trust
Qere are several alternative approaches that permit a RP to
trust a certiZcate but all entail two important mechanisms:
(i) A contractual process for recognizing CAs: this is
used to prove that a given CA meets the legal and
technical requirements of trustworthiness and inter-
operability.
(ii) A mechanism for conveying the recognition of trust-
worthyCAs into theRPs computer system: this is used
to provide information about the trustworthiness of
a CA in a machine-readable format, so that when
the RP’s so`ware receives a digital certiZcate it can
automatically decide to accept it or not. Qis is
achieved via conZguration of at least one root of trust,
or trust anchor, into the RP’s system by some out of
band means. Subsequently certiZcate chains can be
carried in an application level protocol. Providing the
chain starts at an already conZgured root of trust, then
the entire set of CAs in the certiZcate chain can be
trusted.
Qe alternative approaches can be classiZed into three main
categories: (1) trust topologies managed by CAs themselves,
(2) a list of roots of trust managed by the RP or by a trusted
third party (TTP) that is independent of the CAs and is acting
on behalf of the RP, and (3) a hybrid approach in which roots
of trust are managed by the RP or a TTP and subordinate
CAs are managed by the CAs themselves. One of the main
direrences between these approaches is their applicability
to deployment models of PKI, closed or open. Qe open
deployment model is where all CAs on the Internet are able
to be trusted by RPs, whereas the closed deployment model
is where only a limited subset of CAs can be trusted.
Qe implementation of CA managed topologies in the
open model is not feasible. One could imagine a topology
composed of cross-certiZed national root CAs in which each
root CA manages cross-certiZcation processes with their
subordinate CAs located in their jurisdictions. However, even
this cannot be easily achieved for several reasons:
(i) Technically, this topology cannot be implemented
because of the dihculty of managing long certiZ-
cation paths [22]. Qe validation process requires
several checks to be made along the certiZcation path
(e.g., policy constraints, certiZcate status, and policy
mappings). Qe complexity increases with the size of
the certiZcate chain.
(ii) Qis topology is similar to a general accreditation sys-
tem where all CAs must be certiZed by their national
authorities. However, countries do not have the same
viewpoint concerning the right organizational model
of PKIs. For certain countries, national accreditation
may limit innovation and competition between CAs.
(iii) Imagining that the national CAs (root or bridge)
can cross-certify each other implies that a technical
and legal harmonization can be conceived between
direrent nations. In reality this is too dihcult to
achieve because of cultural and legal direrences
between countries.
(iv) Qis topology requires a standardization of the certiZ-
cation process so that a cross-certiZcation realized by
one national CA would be accepted by other national
CAs.However, there is no standard cross-certiZcation
process today.
Alternatively, trust in a certiZcate can be recommended by
any entity independent of CAs. Users in a given community
of interest can obtain information and advice from the leader
of this community about the relevance of certiZcates for
their transactions.Qis recommender should have a technical
and legal expertise suhcient to inform its users about the
relevance of a certiZcate for a given type of transaction. Qe
recommender could be a government (e.g., PKI Gatekeeper
in Australia [23]) or any organization such as a so`ware
vendor (e.g., Microso` or Mozilla).
In general, the recommenders create a list of minimum
requirements and recognize all CAs whose certiZcates have
assurance levels greater than the minimum requirements.
Web browsers are the best known examples of this approach
(Microso` Root CertiZcate Program [24] and Mozilla CA
CertiZcate Policy Inclusion [25]).
In contrast to the previous approach, this approach has
only one mechanism used to transmit the recognition of
certiZcates, which is the trust list. Qere is no homogeneous
way to deZne or formalize the trust lists. While some lists of
certiZcates are just simple lists (e.g., stores of certiZcates in
web browsers) where RPs can themselves add, edit, or delete
certiZcates, others can be signed lists by the recommender
where RPs cannot modify the list. From an interoperability
viewpoint, the trust list replaces the cross-certiZcates used by
CA managed topologies. Qe user trusts the issuer of the list
and transitive trust extends this to the CAs contained in the
list. As a consequence, the issuer of the list plays the role of
trust anchor but is not a CA.
Qanks to the independence of the recommender from
CAs and the absence of need to build certiZcation paths
for the validation of certiZcates, the recognition approach
is more convenient to the open deployment model of PKIs.
However, the current application of this approach is not
optimal for the open deployment model, for several reasons:
(i) Qe nature of the RP’s relation with the recommender
is not formally deZned. It can be formal as in the case
of the Gatekeeper strategy [23] or nonformal as in the
case of web browsers.
(ii) Qe cross-recognition process is a manual nonre-
producible process; it is performed manually by
experts who should examine very large documents
that include a lot of political and legal information.
(iii) Qis approach provides only a binary response, rec-
ognized or not. Unrecognized certiZcates are not
banned to RPs since they are constantly exposed to
them and a decisionmust be made. For unrecognized
certiZcates, RPs may still be invited to inspect the
policies of CAs to decide whether the certiZcates
are suitable for their transactions or not. Qe best
known example is the web browser, when RPs receive
certiZcates signed by CAs that are not included in the
trust list of their browser. Qe RP is asked to take a
decision about the untrusted CA’s certiZcate.
In the hybrid approach, the roots of trust are managed by
the RP or a TTP on the RP’s behalf, and additional CAs are
managed by the root CAs themselves. Qese additional CAs
are termed subordinate CAs (of the root CA) and are fully
trusted by the root CA. Consequently certiZcate chains are
received by the RP and certiZcate path processing is required
by the RP’s so`ware. Qe hybrid approach is the one used on
the Internet today in the open deployment model.
3. The Unified Approach: A New Approach for
Building Trust in X.509 Certificates
Establishing trust in a certiZcate requiresmanaging technical,
organizational, and legal issues. Qis task is complex, so that
only technical and legal experts can perform it. It is not
conceivable to delegate this task to unskilled people acting as
RPs. To address this challenge, we propose a new approach for
managing the trust in certiZcates, which we call the “uniZed
approach.”Qis can help RPs to take ehcient decisions about
certiZcates for both the open and closed PKI deployment
models.
Our approach combines the advantages of the current
trust topologies. It goes further by realizing new criteria that
can increase the ehciency of the RP’s trust decision, such as
the reliability of recommendations.
In the closed model, the administrators of PKIs and
the jurists of organizations play the roles of technical and
legal experts to help their respective employees to decide
about certiZcates coming from other organizations. Qe
trust relationship between RPs and their experts is naturally
created because they belong to the same organization. Qe
trust of the RPs in their administrators is not only related
to the quality of the certiZcates they provide but also on
their ability to recommend the CAs of other organizations.
In addition, the decisions of the RPs can be automatically
conZgured because the interconnection topologies are o`en
built for a predeZned number of services related to the nature
of the collaboration between the organizations.
In the open model, the situation is far more complex for
several reasons:
(i) Qere is no explicit and balanced predeZned trust
relationship between RPs and experts. For example,
web browser editors play implicitly this role as they
manage a list of trustedCAs, but there is no agreement
between the RPs and the editors to hold the editors
responsible for the information they provide.
(ii) Qe scope of the certiZcate’s usage is open (i.e., not
limited to predeZned speciZc services). Qe conse-
quence is that web browsers do not provide enough
information to make an informed decision. Qe rec-
ommendation is binary (trusted or not recognized,
e.g., an icon in the URL bar is blue or not). All trusted
CAs are stored in the same trusted list; therefore
CAs with direrent trust levels are equally trusted
regardless of the usage of the certiZcate.
All these ad hoc solutions, either for the open (e.g., web
browser approach) or for the closed model implicitly, include
the role of expert. Qe direrences lie in the nature of the
entities playing the role of expert, in the type of trust linking
the expert with the RPs, and in the nature of the information
that the expert supplies to RPs.Qe role of the expert has been
added to the latest X.509 trust model, as shown in Figure 5.
Qis explicitly separates the role of certiZcates’ manager from
the role of expert. Qus, the new trust model for X.509 PKIs
is composed of four entities: the Trust Broker, RPs, certiZcate
holders, and CAs. Each entity in this approach has a speciZc
task/responsibility as follows:
(i) CAs are responsible for managing certiZcate lifecy-
cles.
(ii) CertiZcate holders must responsibly use the certiZ-
cates given to them by the CAs.
(iii) RPs must take decisions whether to accept certiZcates
or not.
(iv) TBs are responsible for evaluating CAs on behalf of
RPs (analysis of CP/CPS, auditors, etc.).
Qe TB evaluates the CAs and sends recommendations to
RPs for helping them to take informed decisions about
certiZcates. In this case, the trust model becomes fairer to
RPs because they are protected by one entity, that is, their
technical and legal expert. According to this model, RPs
rely only on the recommendations of their technical and
legal expert and not on each and every CA presented by the
certiZcate holders. Qe relation between the TB and the RP
must be regularized by an explicit contractual agreement. In
such an agreement, the TB recognizes its responsibility to
the RP about its provided recommendations and respects the
privacy of the RP. Qe TB must be independent from the
CAs. However, its relationship with CAs may be regularized
by explicit agreements, so that the TBs can transfer the
responsibility to a CA when a false recommendation is
given due to incorrect information provided by the CA. Qe
contractual agreements between the RPs and the TBs can be
achieved in several ways:
(i) By commercial services, similar to insurance services,
whose business model is to sell recommendations
about certiZcates
(ii) By national organizations whose role is to protect
consumers
One of the main advantages of the TB approach is that it
resolves the interoperability problem of PKIs by transform-
ing it into a trust management problem. Qe persistence
of interoperability problems creates a trust management
problem; if there was a compatibility between PKIs at the
juridical, organizational, and technical levels, there would not
be a trust management problem because there would be a
limited number of classes of globally accepted certiZcates,
where each class met a speciZc context of use. However, the
cultural juridical and technical direrences between coun-
tries are profound. Qus this theoretical solution cannot be
implemented in practice. Qe TB approach does not remove
the interoperability obstacles, but rather it admits their
existence and tries to inform RPs about the risks resulting
from the interoperability problems. Qis approach accepts
interoperability problems because it handles all certiZcates
regardless of the technical and legal rules applied when
generating the certiZcates. In the following sections, we Zrst
give a deZnition of trust in a CA and then deZne a list
of criteria that the uniZed approach must meet. Finally we
present our underlying trust calculation model.
3.1. Trust in CertiDcation Authorities. Qe phrase “trust in a
CA” has been used without explaining what it means exactly
from the perspective of RPs. It is important to deZne this
concept before presenting the calculation model. One should
direrentiate between the terms “trust in a CA” and “trust in
a PKI.” Qus, “trust in a PKI” implies trust in all the CAs
that a PKI contains. However, for the RP that is executing a
transaction, it is only important to evaluate the trust it can
have in the CA that has signed the certiZcate used in the
transaction and in every CA between this CA and the root
of trust.
Although trust seems intuitive to humans, there is no con-
sensus on one single deZnition. Qe concept of trust surers
from an imperfect understanding, a plethora of deZnitions,
and informal use in the literature as well as in everyday life
[26]. Qis is compounded on the Internet, where direrent
meanings and terminologies can be identiZed by language
and/or culture. For example, the English language provides
two words to express two dimensions of trust: “trust” and
“conZdence,” while the French language knows only one
word “conZance.”Qe English language also provides concise
and accurate terms to refer to the partners in a trusting
relationship, namely, trustor and trustee, whereas the French
language lacks these nouns.
Qe direrences between the deZnitions of trust are also
found depending on the discipline of the authors. Psychology
[27], sociology [28, 29], and philosophy [30, 31] are all
disciplines that have devoted erorts to the study of trust.
However, by inspecting these deZnitions, we Znd that they
are generic and applicable to many areas.Qeymay implicitly
include many aspects. It is therefore necessary to specify the
deZnition of trust that explicitly details all the important
aspects of trust in a given area.
In our view, trust in a CA from the perspective of a RP
must be established in terms of the security and reliability
of the CA’s services. Qis depends upon both human and
computer systems. However, the characteristics on which we
rely to trust technological systems are direrent from those to
trust humans. Jøsang [32] explains this direrence in the Zeld
of information security as follows:
(i) Qe security that emerges from a human being is
benevolence to that person, while the security of a
system is the ability to resist attacks. Qe benevolence
of a person means that he/she is honest and straight.
(S)he is honest if (s)he respects their words and
straight if (s)he respects the rules.
(ii) Qe reliability of a person is represented by his/her
qualities such as experiences and skills, while the
reliability of a system is its ability to continually
perform a speciZc task.
Qus, the security and reliability of a CA’s services are
dependent upon the security and the reliability of all the
entities involved in the certiZcation process, both human and
technological. As a consequence, we deZne the trust in a CA
as “Dependence on the ability of people, systems, physical
locations, and so`ware of a CA, as well as on the benevolence
of the CA provider to provide the required security services
while complying with the relevant legislations.”
In this deZnition, we consider people are the individuals
working in both the CA’s and PKI provider’s organizations.
Qeir security characterizes their commitments to the secu-
rity policies (CP/CPS) and the relevant legislations, while the
reliability represents their skills and experiences in the Zeld
of PKI. Qe security of systems and so`ware is the ability of
these entities to resist attacks, while their reliability means
that they are capable of performing tasks continually and
without errors.
Qe given deZnition demonstrates the expectations of
RPs towards CAs. Qe expectations of certiZcate holders
towards their CAs are deZned through contracts. Similarly,
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Figure 6: Qe TB service.
the relationship between RPs and their TBs will be regular-
ized through contracts.
3.2. Trust Evaluation Criteria. Trust evaluation in both the
closed and the open models of PKIs should realize the
following six criteria (note that we do not specify general
so`ware engineering criteria such as ehciency and ease of
use):
Criterion 1 (the evaluation process should be carried out by
an expert on behalf of the RP). Qe recognition of a CA at
the technical and legal level is too complex for most users;
therefore it should be made by an expert working on behalf
of the RPs.
Criterion 2 (recommendation retrieval should be simple and
dynamic). Qe process of retrieving trust recommendations
from an expert should be as simple as possible for RPs and
should be dynamic to cater for changing situations.
Criterion 3 (certiZcate evaluation should be global in scope).
Qe approach should be able to analyse all certiZcates that RPs
may receive, regardless of the technical, legal, or geographic
position of the issuing CA.
Criterion 4 (recommendations should be relevant to the
context of use). Trust recommendations must be as relevant
as possible to the context of use (e.g., authentication of
FTP server, bank server, or merchant server for a payment
transaction). Qis allows RPs to take the most erective
decision without applying considerable mental erort.
Criterion 5 (the privacy of the RP should be respected). Qe
expert should not learn anything about the transaction the
RP wishes to undertake.
Criterion 6 (the reliability of the recommendations). Qe
trust evaluation must consider the reliability of the trust
recommendations.
4. Trust Calculation Model
To help RPs decide about the trustworthiness of subject
certiZcates, a set of quantitative and qualitative information
is sent to them. Qe Trust Broker (TB), as proposed in the
new X.509 trust model, fulZls the Zrst criterion and can
set up a service that provides this information to RPs (see
Figure 6).Qe retrieval of recommendations can therefore be
made simple and dynamic (Criterion 2). Furthermore, there
is no need to handle long certiZcate validation paths as is
the case for CA managed topologies. In the TB model, the
TB is the root of trust for all CAs. Consequently, the RP
only needs to send the CA’s certiZcate to the TB service. Qe
subject’s certiZcate is not needed, since the CA applies the
same procedure to all its issued certiZcates. Furthermore, this
satisZes the 5th criterion or privacy, since the TB does not
knowwhich certiZcate holder the RP is communicating with.
Qe TB service returns other information that can help
the RP to make an informed decision. For example, when an
RP needs to know the liability of the CA in case of problem.
Qe determination of any liability information is obtained
from the CP of the CA by the TB service and relayed as other
information to the RP. In addition, we have added a context
detector at the side of the RP in order to detect the actual
application context. By doing this, the TB service realizes the
4th criterion.
At a purely quantitative level, the TB service sends a
score between 0 and 1 that represents the trustworthiness
of the subjects’ certiZcates in general, called the certiZcate
level of assurance (CLoA). Qis satisZes the 3rd criterion.
When the CLoA is 0, the CA’s procedures for managing the
subjects’ certiZcates are judged by the TB to be very weak
or nonexistent. When the CLoA is 1, the applied procedures
are judged to be very strong and faultless. Qe calculation
of CLoA depends on multiple factors, namely, the CA’s
published procedures (QoCPS), the CA’s actual procedures
(QoCA), and the conZdence the TB has in the CA to adhere
to its procedures (CL). Qis satisZes Criterion 6.
To calculate the certiZcate level of assurance (CLoA), we
propose the following formula:
CLoA = 푛√CL ∗QoCA ∗QoCPS, (1)
where (i) QoCPS ∈ [0, 1] represents the robustness of the
CA’s published procedures in its CP/CPS documents. Qe
value 0 represents the weakest procedures and 1 the strongest
procedures. (ii) QoCA ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of the
CA’s commitment to its published procedures. It is based
on recommendations provided by third parties that monitor
the real practices of a CA such as audit agencies and the
RPs themselves. Qe value 0 represents that there is no
evidence to indicate that any statements in the CP/CPS
have been respected, while 1 indicates that every statement
in the CP/CPS has been implemented according to the
recommenders. (iii) CL ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of
conZdence that the TB has in its calculation of QoCA (we
assume the TB always has 100% conZdence in its calculation
of QoCPS). Qe value 0 means either there is no evidence on
which to calculate QoCAor the TB has zero conZdence in the
evidence that is there, while the value 1 indicates that there is
adequate evidence for the TB to validate every statement in
the CP/CPS. CL can be 1 when QoCA is zero, meaning that
the TB is certain that QoCA is low. (iv) 푛 is an integer value
that allows the TB to control the impact of CL∗QoCA on the
score of CLoA.
Qe maximum value of CLoA is QoCPS because QoCPS
represents the published robustness of the CAs procedures
for managing certiZcates. However, this maximum value can
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Figure 7: Qe semiautomatic process for computing QoCPS.
be degraded because either the CA does not fully respect its
own procedures, or the TB does not have full conZdence in
either the CAs stated procedures or the recommendations
about them. Qis means the value of both CL and QoCA can
decrease the value of QoCPS to re|ect the TB’s assessment of
the overall CLoA.
4.1. Computing theQuality of the CPS (QoCPS). We introduce
a semiautomatic process used to determine the quality of
the CP/CPS documents, as shown in Figure 7. We propose
a technique for structuring CP/CPS documents so that they
can be understood by computers, and then an algorithm
will be used to determine the quality level of the CP/CPS
documents (QoCPS).
4.1.1. CP/CPS Structuring. Qe natural language used for
describing the CertiZcate Policy and practices of a CA is
one of the main obstacles in determining the trustworthiness
of a CA. In order to automatically interpret the CP/CPS
documents, we model the CP/CPS documents as a tree
structure (as illustrated in Figure 8) inspired by the de facto
standard RFC 3647, which deZnes a common framework
for CP/CPS documents. Qe structure is composed of nodes
and leaves, where leaves are atomic trust factors and nodes
are complex trust factors (i.e., a combination of atomic and
complex factors).
For example, “Technical Security Controls” is a node
composed of the following nodes, where ≪≫ represents a
node and <> represents a leaf:
(i) ≪Key Pair Generation and Installation≫
(ii) ≪Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls≫
(iii) ≪Other Aspects of Key Pair Management≫
(iv) ≪Activation Data≫
(v) ≪Computer Security Controls≫
(vi) ≪Life Cycle Security Controls≫
(vii) ≪Network Security Controls≫
(viii) ≪Time Stamping≫
Qe node ≪Key Pair Generation and Installation≫ is com-
posed of the following nodes:
(i) ≪Key Pair Generation≫
(ii) ≪Private Key Delivery to Subscriber≫
(iii) ≪Public Key Delivery to CertiZcate Issuer≫
(iv) ≪CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties≫
(v) ≪Key Sizes≫
(vi) ≪Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality
Checking≫
(vii) ≪Key Usage Purposes≫
Qe node ≪Key Sizes≫ may have the following trust
factors (leaves):
(i) <6.1.5.f1[X,Y]> represents size 푋 of the public key of
the CA certiZcate for algorithm푌, for example, [1024,
ElGamal].
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(ii) <6.1.5.f2[X]> represents the hash algorithm used by
the certiZcate of CA, where 푋 ∈ {SHA-1, SHA-224,
MD5}.
(iii) <6.1.5.f3[X,Y]> represents the public key size 푋 of
certiZcate user for algorithm 푌.
(iv) <6.1.5.f4[X]> represents the hash algorithm used by
the certiZcate user, where 푋 ∈ {SHA-1, SHA-224,
MD5}.
Qe node ≪Key Pair Generation≫ may have the following
leaves:
(i) <6.1.1.f1[X]> represents cryptographic modules used
by CAs for the generation of keys according to the
requirements of standard 푋, where 푋 ∈ {FIPS 140-
1 level 1, FIPS 140-1 level 2, FIPS 140-1 level 3}.
(ii) <6.1.1.f2[X]> represents cryptographic modules used
by users for generation of keys according to the
requirements of standard 푋, where 푋 ∈ {FIPS 140-
1 level 1, FIPS 140-1 level 2, FIPS 140-1 level 3}.
(iii) <6.1.1.f3[X]>: generating the key pairs of the end user
is performed by the user himself, where 푋 ∈ {Oui,
Non}.
(iv) <6.1.1.f4[X]>: generating of the key pairs of the end
user is performed by the CA or RA, where푋 ∈ {Oui,
Non}.
In each leaf, the TB service deZnes a set of possible values
that are semantically known by the TB and the CA.Qe types
of values can be simple answers (yes/no), numerical values,
dates or names of standards, and so forth. Qe trust factors
must be independent of each other; if not, they must form a
complex node. We give each trust factor a reference number
that corresponds to the section number of RFC 3647.
Qe obtained structured Zle constitutes the knowledge
of the TB at time 푡. Qis knowledge can be represented in
an XML Zle. Qe knowledge about a particular CA can be
completed in one of two ways. Either the TB can download
the CA’s CP/CPS, read it, and complete the XML Zle himself
with the CA’s published values, or the TB can send the XML
Zle to the administrator of the CA and ask the latter to
complete it. If the answerer Znds the XML Zle is suhcient
to represent a CA’s CP/CPS, then the quality of the CPS can
be automatically calculated (see next section). Otherwise the
answerer should indicate to the TB that new values from the
CP/CPS aremissing in theXMLknowledge Zle, so that theTB
can analyse them and extend his knowledge. For example, if
Table 1: Trust Utility function for the atomic trust factor 6.1.5.f1 of
Key Sizes.
Utility Algorithm
0 (256, RSA)
0 (512, RSA)
0,25 (1024, RSA)
0,8 (2048, RSA)
0,9 (2048, ElGamal)
1 (4096, RSA)
one CA uses a hash algorithm XYZ that is not present in the
knowledge Zle, then this should be indicated to the TB so that
it can be considered for the next version of the Zle.
4.1.2. Te Calculation of the Quality of CP/CPS Documents.
To determine the QoCPS value, the TB must Zrst deZne the
relative importance of each factor with regard to the other
factors (Figure 8) that comprise a complex node. Qe relative
importance of all arcs leading to a node must add up to 1.0.
For each atomic trust factor, the TB uses a utility function
to deZne the relative importance of each possible value with
regard to the other values. For example, Table 1 represents
the utility function for the atomic trust factor <6.1.5.f1[X,Y]>
of node ≪Key Sizes≫. It gives the value 0.25 if the key size
is 1024 bits, and the algorithm is RSA. It gives the value 0.9
when the key size is 2048 bits and the algorithm is ElGamal.
Qe QoCPS value is the recursive weighted sum of all utility
functions for all the atomic trust factors:
QoCPS (휑푖) = ∑
푗∈children(푖)
휇휑푖휑푗 ∗QoCPS (휑푗) , (2)
where (i) 휑푖 is a node and 휑푗 is a node or a leaf and (ii)
QoCPS(휑푗) = 푈(푉휑푗) where 휑푗 is atomic trust factor. 푈 is
the utility function. Qe utility function allows TBs to deZne
direrent strategies for trust calculations and forms part of
their intellectual property. 푉휑푗 represents selected value for
the atomic trust factor 휑푗; (iii) 휇휑푖휑푗 is the weight between the
factors 휑푗 and 휑푖 in the CP/CPS tree.
Clearly, the values of atomic trust factors will evolve over
time. Qese values may be added, changed, or even deleted.
Similarly, the utility function must be able to evolve over
time. For example, the strength of a cryptographic algorithm
todaywill not be the same a`er several years.Qe values given
to the various atomic trust factors and utility functions are
determined by the TB according to his expertise. Qis is his
intellectual property and will determine in part the value of
his TB service in the market place.
Finally, in order to enable the TB to handle all CAs
regardless of their technical and juridical level, the list of input
values for the atomic trust factors must be published by the
CAs in their CP/CPSs. For example supposing that the TB
service has the following values {SHA-1, SHA-224, MD5} for
the hash algorithm trust factor. If a CA uses an algorithm not
included in the list (such as SHA-512), the TB service analyses
this value, and it updates the corresponding utility function
and references it in the revised list of values.
4.2. Computing the Quality of CA (QoCA). Qe objective
of the quality of CA (QoCA) is to show the degree of
commitment of the CA to its CP/CPS documents. Naturally,
the audit agencies are the main entities that can provide
information about the real commitments of CAs. In fact, the
role of the audit agency is very important because a lot of
practices can be only understood and reviewed by it. By virtue
of the audit agency, the authentication of the evaluated CA
is guaranteed and its claims in the CPS Zle are ensured. For
example, the audit agency is the only entity that is able to
verify the claim of the CA when it states that its private key is
generated and stored in a physically secured environment.
However, the audit agency is not suhcient to provide a
reliable guarantee of total conformity for direrent reasons
[33]:
(i) Time. Qe veriZcation made by an auditing agency is
neither continuous nor permanent. An audit agency
evaluates a CA every year or two.Qis means that the
evaluation conducted a year ago may not re|ect the
current state of the CA, for example, how to ensure
that the list of revoked certiZcates is available 24/7.
(ii) Number of CertiDcates. An audit agency cannot verify
all certiZcates issued by a CA, for example, how to
verify that a CA has really respected the announced
certiZcate proZle in its CP/CPS for each one of
thousands of certiZcates and how to verify that none
of these certiZcates are free of errors (e.g., DSA
certiZcates with 2048-bit primes or RSA certiZcates
with a public exponent equal to 1).
(iii) Te Independence of Audit Agencies. It is dihcult to
guarantee the independence of audit agencies from
CAs, especially because audit agencies are paid by
the CAs to perform the evaluation. We recognize that
auditors may need the permissions of the CAs to
release their results to the TB services. Governments
must ensure that CAs give this right to auditors or at
least that a summary of their results is made available
to TB services.
In addition, we propose new entities that can help in verifying
the real commitments of a CA to its CP/CPS documents:
(i) Clients of TB Service. An RP depends on the TB
service for providing her with the necessary infor-
mation to take an informed decision. (S)he can also
play the role of a recommender to the TB service by
providing it with information about the correctness
of some of the parameters announced by a CA dur-
ing certiZcate validation, for example, availability of
CRLs. Qe RP may also be a certiZcate holder so that
it can send the TB service some recommendations
about the commitments of its CA. TB clients can
only supplement the assessment of the audit agencies
because many parameters of the CP/CPS such as
physical controls (e.g., Zre prevention and protection
of premises), procedural controls (e.g., procedures to
ensure segregation of duties), or personal checks (e.g.,
qualiZcation and experience) can only be veriZed by
an audit agency. Qe recommendations sent by the
TB’s clients may need to be veriZed by the TB service
to ensure their veracity. Among the parameters that
can be recommended by TB clients are the following:
(a) Qe availability of a CA’s 24/7 revocation service:
this can be analysed by the RP when validating
a certiZcate. When the revocation service is
not available the RP can automatically send
(negative) recommendations to the TB service.
(b) Qe certiZcate proZle can be veriZed automati-
cally by an RP, to say whether it conforms to the
declarations in the CA’s CP/CPS documents or
not (e.g., key usage extension). Qe TB provides
the RP with this when it sends the CLoA.
(ii) Competitor TB Services. TB services can share their
experiences with other TB services who they know
or compete with, in order to help determine the real
commitment of a CA. Qis is similar to insurance
companies sharing information today. In addition,
cooperation between TB services can facilitate certain
actions, such as the conZrmation of the actual exis-
tence of a CA or an audit agency. Qe relationships
between TB services could be regulated through
bilateral agreements or trade associations. Bilateral
agreements can be easily constructed, because all TB
services have the same motivation, which is increas-
ing the scope and ehciency of their evaluations.
Each TB service can control the impact of other TB
services on its Znal result (CLoA, CL, etc.) according
to the trust it has in the competitor TB service.
Competitor TB servicesmay be reluctant to cooperate
with other TB services, especially when they are
competing in the same market, but trade associations
help competitors to collaborate. TB services that are
dominant in direrent markets may cooperate for
mutual beneZt. For example, a French TB servicemay
cooperate with a Japanese TB service so that they can
exchange useful information about CAs’ certiZcates
used by their clients.
Qus, we have a participative system that can be used to
compute the QoCA. We propose to apply these trust and
reputation management approaches in order to compute this
value. We have selected the REGRET model [34], which is a
modular approach formanaging trust and reputation. It takes
into account three dimensions:
(i) Te Personal Dimension. It refers to direct interac-
tion between entities. When entity A gives certain
promises to entity B, then entity B scores entity A
according to its real commitment to its promises. For
example, seller A sets a date for the delivery of a
product to customer B. If the product arrived a`er
that date, then entity B negatively scores sellerA based
on the negative impact of the delay. If the product
arrived on time, entity B positively scores seller A
because it has respected its promises.
(ii) Te Social Dimension. With the social dimension,
the REGRET model adds the ability to re|ect the
characteristics of complex social relationships using
the group concept. In many societies, a person inher-
its the reputation of the group to which it belongs.
When direct experiences with an entity are missing,
the reputation of its group gives initial expectations
about the behaviour of the entity. In the same way,
an entity may use the experiences of the members of
its own group, or the group of the unknown entity, to
complete its expectations about the unknown entity.
However, we do not consider the group that the CA is
a member of when calculating the reputation of that
CA. In our case, the social dimension is calculated
based on the recommendations sent by clients of the
TB and other TBs it has a relationship with.
(iii) Te Ontological Dimension. Qe REGRET model
assumes that the reputation of a person is not a
single and abstract concept, but rather a multifaceted
concept. For example, the reputation of an airline is
based on the reputation of its aircra`, its baggage
handling, its check-in procedures, and its on board
catering. In turn, the reputation of an aircra` summa-
rizes the reputation of the maintenance service, the
manufacturer, the engine, and other characteristics.
Qese types of reputation and the way they are
combined is the ontological dimension of reputa-
tion. Note that each person could have a direrent
ontological structure to combine reputations and a
direrent way to moderate their importance. In our
case the ontological dimension of trust in a CA is the
amalgamation of many direrent atomic trust factors
arising from the CP/CPS documentation.
In order to calculate the QoCA using this model, the nature
of the recommendation values should be changed. Instead
of the recommenders providing their personal evaluations
to the TB, they should provide the actual values of the
CA parameters; then the evaluation of these parameters
can be made by the TB service. For example, when a CA
states in its certiZcation policy that the download time of a
CRL list should not exceed 30ms, the recommenders value
should be the actual time, for example, 40ms, and not its
recommendation score, for example, a number between 0
and 1. When calculating the QoCA, the following stages are
proposed for the TB service.
4.2.1. Preparation Stage. Qe TB service should consider a
number of important points for each trust factor:
(i) Types of recommenders: the TB must determine for
each trust factor which recommenders can validate
it. Qe list of recommenders depends on the nature
of the trust factor and some can be validated only by
audit agencies.
(ii) Qe collectionmethod of recommendations: this may
direr according to the nature of the trust factors and
recommenders. Audit agencies could send periodic
reports to the TB service containing all the real values
found during the audit (subject of course to the agree-
ment of the CA).Qe RPs, the certiZcate holders, and
other TB services could send their recommendations
either spontaneously, periodically, or on request. For
example, for the trust factor “the availability of the
24/7 revocation service,” the RPs could periodically
notify the TB service about this factor, while for
the trust factor “in case CA is compromised, the
CA should spontaneously notify all subscribers and
RPs about the compromise” the collection could be
spontaneous. On request collection can be achieved
through various techniques including the use of
questionnaires, web forms, and e-mail messages.
(iii) Types of recommendations: the TB must determine
whether the recommenders should send positive
recommendations (when conZrming promises) or
negative ones (in case of nonfulZlment of promises).
4.2.2. Calculation Stage. To calculate the value of QoCA, the
TB service should take into account the personal, social, and
ontological dimensions. Two types of recommenders should
be considered in the calculation: identiZable recommenders,
which are audit agencies, competitor TB services, certiZcate
holders, and client RPs, and unknown recommenders, which
are RPs who are not clients and whose identities are not
known by the TB service.
Qe identiZcation of the recommenders helps in imple-
menting anticheating mechanisms that neutralize suspect
recommendations. Qe recommendations sent by identiZed
entities can be automatically accepted butweighted according
to the degree that the TB service believes in their recom-
mendations. Qe weight factor indicates the impact that the
recommender can have on the Znal score. Determining this
weight factor is part of the intellectual property of the TB
and is one of the factors in distinguishing between TBs.
Recommendations provided by unidentiZed entities must be
validated by the TB before being accepted. If the cost of
the validation of a speciZc trust factor is low, for example,
checking that an OCSP server is available or not, then both
negative and positive recommendations from unidentiZed
RPs can be accepted; otherwise the TB service should only
validate negative recommendations as these show that theCA
is failing in some respect.
Each recommender sends a recommendation 푟 that has
the following form:
푟 = (푠, ca, 휑, V, 푡) , (3)
where the entity 푠 (sender) indicates the set of actual values V
of the atomic trust factors 휑 when it had an experience with
a certiZcation authority ca at time 푡.
Let 푅 be the set of all possible recommendations. We
deZne 푅푠→ca휑푗 ⊆ 푅 as the set of the recommendations sent by 푠
about ca for the atomic trust factor 휑푗:
푅푠→ca휑푗 = {푟 = (푠푟, ca푟, 휑푟, V푟, 푡푟) ∈ 푅 | 푠푟 = 푠, ca푟
= ca, 휑푟 = 휑푗}
(4)
Qe QoCA for the personal dimension of trust factor 휑푗
for the certiZcation authority ca can be calculated by the TB
service (휀) as follows:
QoCAPersonal (푅휀→ca휑푗 ) =
∑푖∈푅휀→ca휑푗 휌 (푡푐, 푡푖) ∗ 푊
푖
휑푗
푛 ,
(5)
where (i) 푅휀→ca휑푗 represents all the personal evaluations of
the TB service (휀) about the ca for the trust factor 휑푗.
(ii) 푊푖휑푗 is the direrence between the value promised in
the CPS and the actual value calculated by the TB service
for the recommendation 푖. (iii) 휌(푡푐, 푡푖) is a time-dependent
function that gives more importance to the most recent
recommendations, where 푡푐 is the current time and 푡푖 is the
time when recommendation 푖 has been stored. We do not Zx
this function, because this function can be deZned in several
ways depending on the type of trust factor. Qis is part of
the intellectual property of the TB. (iv) 푛 is the number of
evaluations stored in 푅휀→ca휑푗 .
푊푖휑푗 can be calculated using this function:
푊휑푗 =
{{{{
{{{{
{
푈(푉휑푗) ∗ 100
푈(푉퐶휑푗)
푈(푉휑푗) < 푈(푉퐶휑푗)
1 otherwise,
(6)
where (i)푉휑푗 is the measured value of trust factor 휑푗, (ii)푉퐶휑푗
is the promised value by the CA in its CPS for the trust factor
휑푗, and (iii) 푈 is the utility function.
QoCASoc(휑푗) is the QoCA value for the social dimension
of each atomic trust factor (휑푗); it can be calculated as follows:
QoCASoc (휑푗) = ∑
푠∈푆
휉푠QoCAPersonal (푅푠→ca휑푗 ) , (7)
where (i) 푆 is the global set of identiZable recommenders,
including auditors, RPs, and competitor TBs and (ii) 휉푠 is a
parameter associated with each recommender 푠. It is used to
control the impact of each recommender on the Znal score
where ∑푠∈푆 휉푠 = 1. Qis forms yet another component of the
intellectual property of the TB.
For each trust factor, the personal dimension and the
social one can be combined to obtain one trust score as
follows:
Eval (휑푗) = 훼 ∗QoCAPersonal (푅휀→ca휑푗 ) + 훽
∗QoCASoc (휑푗) ,
(8)
where (i) 훼, 훽 are conZgurable parameters that control the
impact of the personal and social dimension on the Znal
score, where 훼 + 훽 = 1.
Qe ontological dimension allows the TB to calculate the
Znal value of QoCA.Qe QoCAOnto value for a leaf or a node
can be calculated as follows:
QoCAOnto (휑푖) = ∑
휑푗∈children(휑푖)
휇휑푖휑푗 ∗QoCA
Onto (휑푗) , (9)
where (i)QoCAOnto(휑푗) = QoCASoc(휑푗)when휑푗 is an atomic
trust factor, (ii) 휑푖 is a leaf or a node, and (iii) 휇휑푖휑푗 is the
weighting factor between nodes 휑푖 and 휑푗 in the tree CP/CPS.
Each TB will have their own values for the various weighting
factors.
Qe Znal value of QoCA is QoCAOnto for the factor
CPSdocument which is the root of the CP/CPS tree:
QoCA = QoCAOnto (CPSdocument) . (10)
4.3. Calculation of the ConDdence Level (CL). Qe conZdence
level (CL) states to which extent the TB service is conZdent
about the calculation of QoCA. Many factors can be consid-
ered, but here we considered the three major factors:
(i) Number of Recommendations. For each trust factor,
a minimum threshold of recommendations is set. If
the threshold is not reached then the reliability of the
trust factor cannot be established.When a trust factor
can only be evaluated by audit agencies, the threshold
is set to 1, otherwise it should be greater than 1.
(ii) RecommendationsHeterogeneity.Qemore the values
of recommendations are homogenous, the more the
calculation of QoCA is reliable. Qis factor is not
taken into account when the recommender is an audit
agency.
(iii) Recommendation Dates. Qe more recent the rec-
ommendations are, the more reliable they are. Qis
parameter is considered for all types of recom-
menders.
Qe CL for the personal dimension and for the trust
factor 휑푗 is the convex combination of the three functions
representing the three aforementioned factors:
CLPersonal (푅휀→ca휑푗 ) = 훾푁 ∗ 푁푖 (푅
휀→ca
휑푗 ) + 훾퐷푡
∗ 퐷푡 (푅휀→ca휑푗 ) + 훾Decay
∗ Decay (푅휀→ca휑푗 ) ,
(11)
where (i) 훾푁 + 훾퐷푡 + 훾Decay = 1 allows the TB to control
the impact of each factor on the Znal score and forms part
of its intellectual property. (ii) 푁푖(푅휀→ca휑푗 ) = {sin((1/2 ∗
푖푡푚)|푅휀→ca휑푗 |), |푅
휀→ca
휑푗 | ∈ [0, 푖푡푚]; 1,Otherwise}; (iii) |푅
휀→ca
휑푗 | is
the carinality of 푅휀→ca휑푗 ; (iv) 푖푡푚 is the threshold a`er which
the conZdence value always becomes 1; (v) 퐷푡(푅휀→ca휑푗 ) = 1 −
∑푖∈푅휀→ca휑푗 |푤푖 − 푤| gives a value between 0 and 1. Qe value 0
indicates that the recommendations are so direrent (i.e., not
reliable). Qe value 1 indicates that the recommendations are
homogenous and can be considered reliable. 푤 is the average
of the recommendations values. (vi) Decay(푅휀→ca휑푗 ) is a time-
dependent function that gives values between 0 and 1. It is
used to indicate the freshness of recommendations owned by
an entity.
CLSoc represents the CL value a`er considering the social
dimension. It can be calculated as follows:
CLSoc (휑푗) = ∑
푠∈푆
휉푠CLPersonal (푅푠→ca휑푗 ) , (12)
where (i) 푆 is the global set of identiZable recommenders,
including auditors, RPs, and competitor TBs and (ii) 휉푠 is a
parameter associated with each recommender 푠. It is used to
control the impact of each recommender on the Znal score
where ∑푠∈푆 휉푠 = 1. Qis forms yet another component of the
intellectual property of the TB.
For each trust factor, the personal dimension and the
social one can be combined to obtain one trust score as
follows:
Eval (휑푗) = 훼 ∗ CLSoc (휑푗) + 훽
∗∑
푠∈푆
휉푠CLPersonal (푅푠→ca휑푗 ) .
(13)
(i) 훼 and 훽 are conZgurable parameters that control the
impact of the personal and social dimension on the Znal
score, where 훼 + 훽 = 1.
Qe ontological dimension allows the TB to calculate the
Znal value of CL. Qe CLOnto for a leaf or a node can be
calculated as follows:
CLOnto (휑푖) = ∑
휑푗∈children(휑푖)
휇휑푖휑푗 ∗ CL
Onto (휑푗) , (14)
where (i) CLOnto(휑푗) = CLSoc(휑푗) when 휑푗 is an atomic trust
factor, (ii) 휑푖 is a leaf or a node, and (iii) 휇휑푖휑푗 is the weighting
factor between nodes 휑푖 and 휑푗 in the tree CP/CPS. Each TB
will have their own values for the various weighting factors.
Qe Znal value of CL is CLOnto for the factor CPSdocu-
ment which is the root of the CP/CPS tree:
CL = CLOnto (CPSdocument) . (15)
4.4. Discussion. Our trust model orers two principal advan-
tages; Zrst, it re|ects the direrent points of view of TBs by
allowing them to conZgure their own expertise into their
computations. Second, it resolves the problem of interop-
erability by adopting a calculation method based on utility
functions and weighting factors. Indeed, the utility functions
푈(푉휑푗) and the weight factors 휇휑푖휑푗 allow several direrent
strategies for trust calculations.
It should be noted that our evaluation system is designed
to consider not only technical issues but also juridical ones.
Qus, it is impossible to Zx these trust metrics as they
re|ect the |avour of TBs and their own expertise and
preferences. It is true that some trust factors can be objectively
measured, but their relevance for a given application remains
a subjective matter. For example, it is clear that SHA-512
is stronger than SHA-256 for the trust factor of the hash
algorithm. But the relevance of SHA-256 for an application
such as web server authentication is still a subjective question
for experts. Chadwick and Basden [35] have demonstrated
this phenomenon by asking PKI experts to prioritize the
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Figure 9: Qe prototype architecture.
PKIs trust factors.Qe study concluded by demonstrating the
dihculty in reaching a consensus among experts. Chadwick
and Basden gave several reasons for this dihculty.
Our trust model enables the resolving of interoperability
problems. In fact, TBs can adapt their calculation models
to meet the needs of their clients as well as the context of
use. For example, in Greece, a certiZcate has legal erect, if
the retention period of electronic records is over 30 years,
while in Spain it is only 15 years [36]. Qe utility function
that processes this trust factor can give a high importance
for a certiZcate that has a retention period of 15 years when
the certiZcate is used in Spain and low importance when the
certiZcate is used in Greece. Another example is the use of
pseudonyms in certiZcates. Most European countries, except
Estonia and Bulgaria [36], authorize the use of pseudonyms
in certiZcates.Qe TB service is able to deal with this problem
of interoperability between European countries using utility
functions. When a certiZcate with a pseudonym is used in
Estonia or Bulgaria, the utility function that processes this
trust factor gives a value of 0 for this certiZcate.
Finally, our calculation system prevents collusion from
unidentiZed entities. However, collusion from identiZed enti-
ties is dihcult to prevent, especially if the number of conspir-
ators is greater than the number of honest entities. However,
each TB will be contractually linked to the identiZed entities
(audit agencies, other TBs, and users). If something goes
wrong, the conspirators can be prosecuted.
5. Prototype in the Web Context
We have implemented a prototype in the context of the web,
where the RPs are human entities accessing various websites
via a web browser. CertiZcate holders are the users who
purchase certiZcates for their web servers. Our prototype TB
web service comprises two principal components (as shown
in Figure 9):
Trust factor list
XML parser
Calculation of
CLoA, QoCPS,
QoCA, and CL
Recommendations 
collection
TB Service
Figure 10: Qe TB service modules.
(i) Decision helper component: this component helps
RPs make contextually informed decisions about
certiZcates.
(ii) Recommendation collector component: this compo-
nent collects recommendations sent by client RPs.
Qe TB service consists of the following modules
(Figure 10):
(i) Qe trust factors list module contains the TB’s list of
trust factors in XML format.
(ii) Qe XML parser module processes the XML trust
Zles provided by either the cooperating CAs or the
TB (for noncooperating CAs). Each trust Zle contains
the answers to the list of trust factors for one CA,
re|ecting its certiZcation policies andprocedures (i.e.,
values for the trust factors).
(iii) Qe recommendations collection module collects the
recommendations sent by client RPs.
(iv) Qe calculation module computes the CLoA, QoCPS,
QoCA, and CL.
<!ELEMENT KeySizes (f1 615, f2 615, f3 615, f4 615)>
<!ATTLIST KeySizes id (6.1.5) #REQUIRED>
<!ELEMENT f1 615 (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST f1 615 KeySize (256| 512| 1024| 2048| 4096| other)
#REQUIRED algorithm (RSA| ElGamal |Merkle-Hellman | other) #REQUIRED>
<!ELEMENT f2 615 (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST f2 615 Hash (SHA-1 | SHA-224|MD5 | other) #REQUIRED>
<!ELEMENT f3 615 (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST f3 615 KeySize (256| 512| 1024| 2048| 4096| other)
#REQUIRED algorithm (RSA| ElGamal |Merkle-Hellman | other) #REQUIRED>
<!ELEMENT f4 615 (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST f4 615 Hash (SHA-1| SHA-224|MD5 | other) #REQUIRED>
Listing 1: Qe Key Size trust factor for a particular TB service.
<KeySizes id=” 6.1.5 ”>
<f1 615 KeySize=” 1024” algorithm=”RSA”/>
<f2 615 Hash=”MD5”/>
<f3 615 KeySize=” 1024” algorithm=”RSA”/>
<f4 615 Hash=”MD5”/>
</KeySizes>
Listing 2: An example trust data structure for a particular CA.
In addition we have implemented a Firefox extension
module that modiZes the way that Firefox handles certiZ-
cates, by Zrst communicatingwith the TB service.QeTB ser-
vice interacts with CAs and with RP clients. In the following
section we give more details about these interactions.
5.1. Interaction between TB Service and CAs. Qe list of trust
factors is made public by the TB service. It is constructed
using the XML DTD format. For example, we have deZned
the DTD component for the leaf “Key Sizes” as shown below
in Listing 3. Qis depicts the structure of the leaf “Key Sizes”
in the CP/CPS tree. It contains four atomic factors of trust:
“the size of the CA’s public key and the key algorithm,” “the
hash algorithm used for the CA’s certiZcate,” “the size of the
public key of the user’s certiZcate and its key algorithm,” and
“the hash algorithm used for the user’s certiZcate.”
Each cooperating CA picks up the trust factor list and
returns an XML Zle that contains answers to the atomic
factors (see Figure 11). Qe cooperating CA sends this Zle
back to the TB service in order for it to determine the
QoCPS. For noncooperating CAs, the TB must retrieve the
CA’s CP/CPS and answer the questions themselves. (S)he can
then submit the resulting Zle to the XML parser. Qe XML
component for the node≪Key Sizes≫ trust element can take
the form presented in Listing 2. If a CA uses a value that is not
already referenced in the DTD list of trust factors, then the
actual value must be labelled as “other” before the trust Zle is
returned to the TB (see Listing 3). For example, for the trust
factor “Key Sizes,” a CA may use the value “SHA-512.” Qis
<KeySizes id=”6.1.5" >
<f1 615 KeySize=” 1024” algorithm=”RSA”/>
<f2 615 Hash=” other”> SHA-512</f2 615>
<f3 615 KeySize=” 1024” algorithm=”RSA”/>
<f4 615 Hash=”MD5”></f4 615>
</KeySizes>
Listing 3: An example trust data structure returning a value
unknown to the TB service.
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Figure 11: Interaction of TB service with CAs.
value is not included in Listing 1 for this particular TB service,
so the QoCPS cannot be analysed automatically. When the
TB service receives the trust Zle, it should update the utility
function for this new value and update the list of referenced
values in the DTD.
5.2. Interaction between TB Service and Clients. Qere are
two types of interactions between the TB service and its
RP clients: interaction for helping clients to make informed
decision about certiZcates and interaction for receiving rec-
ommendations from clients about certain trust factors of
CAs.
5.2.1. Helping Clients to Make Informed Decision. Qere are
four main actors in this case (Figure 12):
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Con-gure URL of TB service in the web
browser
Forward the CA certi-cate to the TB client
Manage decision database
Web browsers
TB client
TB
Web user
Validate the certi-cates’ -elds
C
o
n
tr
ac
t
b
as
ed
 r
el
at
io
n
Figure 12: Qe main actors in 4-cornered based validation system.
(i) Qe RP: the end user that will ultimately make the
decision to accept or reject a certiZcate. Qe RP
chooses its own web browser.
(ii) Qe browser extension module (TB client): the entity
that allows RPs to communicate with TB services.
It manages the decisions of RPs about certiZcates.
It should also provide an interface to enable RPs to
select the TB service that they wish to depend on. Our
objective is to make web browsers totally transparent
in the decision-making process.
(iii) QeTB service: the entity that calculates the certiZcate
quality information.
(iv) Qe web browser: the entity that forwards the CA
certiZcate to the TB client.
Figure 13 illustrates the direrent steps that we have
implemented to realize the validation of certiZcates.
When a user contacts a web service via an TLS connec-
tion, for example, to make an online payment, the user wants
to be assured that their information is sent to the correct web
service and that any received information comes from the
right service.
Qe web server initially sends its certiZcate to the web
browser. It is not possible at this point in time for the web
browser to discover the RP’s intended use of the certiZcate.
Qis is because the server’s web page can deZne several
contexts of certiZcate use. For example, when a user vis-
its the site https://www.somesite.com, the homepage may
have two forms that deZne two direrent contexts of use;
the Zrst form allows the user to connect to the server
https://www.login.somesite.com and the second form allows
the user to register by sending information to the server
https://www.register.somesite.com. Before sending themper-
sonal or conZdential data to either of these servers, the user’s
browser must retrieve the server’s address and extract the
certiZcate that is used to determine if (s)he can trust the
certiZcate of the server for the speciZc context. We have
identiZed three direrent contexts of use for a user sending
personal or conZdential data to a web server:
(1) Connection login: the user will send a username
and password to the web server and therea`er will
establish a secure session duringwhichmanydirerent
types of transaction may take place, for example,
database access, Zle access, and online transaction.
(2) Registration: the user will send her personal informa-
tion to the web server in order to create an account.
(3) Payment: the userwill send her bank account or credit
card details to the server in order to buy a product.
Qe user may or may not be logged in.
Our extension module monitors the behaviour of the user
to see when (s)he will send their personal information to a
server. When the user clicks on the send button, the module
extension suspends the sending, extracts the certiZcate, and
requests the quality information about the certiZcate from the
TB service. Qe TB service returns the quality information
signed by its public key (which was conZgured into the exten-
sionwhen the user chose her trusted TB service).Qemodule
extension will then Zlter the returned information based on
the certiZcate’s context of use.When the context of use cannot
be determined then it shows themost informative/qualitative
information about the certiZcate to the user.
Qe browser extension tries to automatically determine
the context of use based on the content of the personal data
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Figure 13: Illustration of certiZcate validation steps.
being requested. For example, when a single Zeld of type
“password” exists in a web form, we assume the form is used
to allow users to login to the server. When there are two
Zelds of type “password,” we assume the form is used for
the registration of new users. When there is a Zeld of type
credit card type or credit card number, we assume a payment
is about to be made. However, we recognize that this is not
always the case and that there are other caseswherewe cannot
determine the intended use of the certiZcate. Consequently,
we have prepared a simple questionnaire (see Figure 15) that
appears when the user Zrst wants to send information to a
server over a TLS connection.Qis allows the user to conZrm
or alter the automatically determined context of use.
Qe quality information returned to the user in case of
connection login (see the GUI in Figure 14) is as follows:
(i) CLoA, called Identity Assurance in the GUI
(ii) Qe name of the certiZcate holder, called Contacted
Web Site in the GUI
(iii) Qe name of the certiZcation authority, called Identity
VeriZed By in the GUI
(iv) A link towards the certiZcate’s CP/CPS, called Agree-
ment of CertiZcate Usage in the GUI
Figure 14:Making a decision about a certiZcate used for connection
login.
(v) Qe Znancial protection orered to the client by the
CA, in case of false certiZcate information
Any additional information that might be important to the
client is sent by the TB service. For example, when the user
wants to buy a product, the allowed maximum money to
pay for the purchase is critical information (Figure 16). If the
Figure 15: Determining the context of use for a certiZcate.
Figure 16: Making a decision about a certiZcate used for providing
payment information.
client wants to purchase a product whose price is higher than
the protection orered by the CA in its CP, then he/she loses
the right to be fully covered by Znancial protection.Qus it is
important to inform the client about this fact.
When the user makes a decision about a certiZcate, we
record this decision and the context of use in a local store
of the web browser along with the CA’s certiZcate and CLoA
score. In this way, the extension module will not ask the user
to remake a decision about the same context of use for any
web server certiZcate issued by the same CA. However, the
extension will ask the user to remake a decision about any
of the CA’s issued certiZcates if its quality information has
changed since the last time the decision was made or the
context of use is direrent.
When the user wants to connect to or register with a
server, the allowed decisions are only “accept” or “reject” the
certiZcate. But when the client wants to send information
related to a commercial transaction, the decision becomes
“refuse/terminate the transaction,” “accept only for this
transaction,” or “accept for all transactions.” We have added
the middle option allowing a decision to be taken for each
transaction because the risks associated with a payment vary
according to the amount of the transaction. We therefore
adapt our user interface to the context of the certiZcate’s use.
5.3. Recommendations Collecting. Qe TB service can auto-
matically collect recommendations when its RP clients are
using server certiZcates. Qere are several trust factors that
can be automatically veriZed by the browser extension. In
our prototype, we monitor the proZles of certiZcates and the
availability of OCSP servers.
QeTB service sends to the browser extensionmodule the
proZle of certiZcates issued by the server’s CA.Qe extension
checks the server’s certiZcate against the certiZcate proZle and
notiZes the TB service when a violation is detected.
In addition, we verify the requirements imposed on cer-
tiZcate proZles of “extended validation” certiZcates. Accord-
ing to the guidelines of the CA/Browser Forum [37] Extended
Validation (EV) certiZcates must meet a number of strict
requirements concerning the subject name, the crypto-
graphic algorithms, the key usage Zeld, and revocation infor-
mation. Our TB service deZnes the XML proZle presented in
Listing 4 that contains all these requirements.
When the browser extension detects any problem related
to a certiZcate’s proZle, it asks the user for permission to send
the certiZcate to the TB service, along with the identiZed
problem. In addition, the browser extension also checks the
availability of OCSP servers and reports to the TB service
when one is not available.
Before recording any recommendations about a CA, the
TB service checks if they are correct or not. If correct, it
records a positive or negative recommendation about the
concerned trust factor.
6. How Can the 4-Cornered Trust Model
Improve the Security of Web Users?
SuperZsh and the other incidents demonstrate one fact:
no one has assumed the responsibility or liability for any
consequences related to these incidents. From a theoretical
point of view, only the CAs are liable to the web users in
case of problems. In practice, web users are not able to
prosecute CAs because they are not technically able to prove
the responsibility of CAs.
Nevertheless, even when the web users are able to prove
the responsibility of CAs, they will not be protected com-
pletely. SuperZsh and eDellRoot incidents have shown how
it is possible to intercept the TLS communications of web
users without necessarily compromising the systems of CAs
or asking them to issue false certiZcates.
Qe main reason for this situation is that the web TLS
system is designed so that web users must depend on a
multitude of entities, other than CAs, in order to secure their
transactions. As an examplewewill compare the intermediate
entities in the case of the current validation system with the
entities implied in the case of our proposal.
Figure 17(a) shows an example of the entities that are
intervening in the current validation system. Qis represents
a web user that uses a Windows OS and uses direrent web
browsers for surZng the web, including Firefox. Qe Zrst
important issue to note is that web users do not have any
assigned tasks to achieve. Everything is executed without
their knowledge. From a usability point of view, this issue can
be seen as an advantage. However, from the security point of
view, the current validation system compromises the security
of web users because they depend on unknown entities to
secure their transactions. In Figure 17(a), we recognize that
<?xml version= 1 .0? >
<CertProZle>
<! Verisign CA id of EV CertiZcate ––>
<CAId value=” 3 C : 48 : 42 : 0D : FF : 58 : 1A : 38 : 86 : BC : FD : 41 : D4 : 8A : 41 : DE” />
<ProZle Version value=” 5.0” />
<Subject type=” Zeld” component=”O” presence=” Obligatory” />
<Subject type=” Zeld” component=”CN” presence=” Obligatory”
value=” dnshostname” valueExclude=”∗” />
<Subject type=” Zeld” component=”C” presence=” Obligatory” />
<Subject type=” Zeld” component=”L” presence=” Obligatory” />
<Subject type=” Zeld” component=”ST” presence=” Obligatory” />
<! –– : this Deld MUST contain the Registration (or similar)
Number assigned to the Subject by the Incorporating or Registration
Agency in its Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration––>
<Subject component=” Object␣IdentiZer.∗2␣5␣4␣5.∗” Type=” Zeld”
presence=” Obligatory”/>
<!–– : Te validity period for an EV CertiDcate SHALL NOT exceed
twenty seven months.––>
<Validity type=” Zeld” value=” 27” />
<DigestSignatureAlgorithm value=” (SHA-1|SHA-256|SHA-384|SHA-512)” />
<KeySize component=” Key␣Size” value=” (1024|2048)” />
<!–– : MUST be present and SHOULD NOT be marked critical. Te set of
policyIdentiDers MUST include the identiDer for the CAs extended
validation policy.––>
<CertiZcate Policies type=” extension” critical=” Not␣Critical”
presence=” Obligatory” value=” oid” />
<!–– : SHOULD be present and MUST NOT be marked critical. It MUST
contain the HTTP URL of the CAs CRL service. Tis extension MUST
be present if the certiDcate does not specify OCSP responder.––>
<CRL Distribution Point type=” extension” critical=” Not␣Critical”
presence=” Obligatory” value=” httpservicehost” />
<!–– : SHOULD be present and MUST NOT be marked critical. SHALL
contain the HTTP URL of the CAs OCSP responder. Tis extension
MUST be present if the certiDcate does not contain a
cRLDistributionPoint extension.––>
<Authority Information Access type=” extension” critical=” Not␣Critical”
presence=” Obligatory” value=” httpservicehost” />
<!–– : the presence of key usage extension is optional. If present,
the CA Deld MUST be set false.––>
<Basic Constraints type=” extension” critical=” Not␣Critical”
presence=”optional” value=” false” />
<!–– : the presence of key usage extension is optional. If present,
bit positions for keyCertSign and cRLSign MUST NOT be set––>
<key Usage type=” extension” critical=” Not␣Critical”
presence=” Optional” valueExclude=” (CertiZcate␣Signer|CRL␣Signer)” />
</ CertProZle>
Listing 4: Example of XML proZle for EVS certiZcate.
Microso` and Mozilla are the “ohcial” TBs because they are
the entities that realize tasks 1 and 2 on behalf of theweb users.
We have put the term ohcial in quotation marks because the
web users did not delegate ohcially Microso` or Mozilla to
achieve tasks 1 and 2 on behalf of them. If something goes
wrong, Microso` and Mozilla will not refund web users in
case of problems. In addition, certiZcate distributers do not
have the obligation to help web users to prosecute malevolent
CAs in case of loss.
Qe SuperZsh incident was produced because Lenovo
had an access to the list of CAs provided by Microso`.
Lenovo injected the certiZcate of a self-signed CA and used
its so`ware SuperZsh to intercept the TLS communications
of Lenovo users (i.e., MITM attack). Naturally, users are
not able to detect such kind of problems, because the
current validation system is designed so that everything
is executed transparently without the knowledge of web
users.
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Figure 17: A comparison between the current validation system and the 4-cornered validation system.
Qe MITM attacks would not be possible if the integrity
of the trust list is guaranteed, that is, ensuring that the
OS/Browser editors and web users are the only authorized
entities to modify the trust lists. Unfortunately, this is not
enough because web users have to use web browsers to com-
plete the validation process. Web users may use known web
browsers such as Google Chrome and Firefox, but they may
use also unknown ones for completing the validation process.
Georgiev et al. [38] demonstrate that SSL certiZcate validation
is completely broken in many security-critical applications
and libraries.Qemain reason is that developers tend to badly
conZgure the APIs of direrent SSL implementations (such
as JSSE, OpenSSL, and GnuTLS) and data-transport libraries
(such as cURL).
Finally, from the usability point of view, the current
validation system confuses the web users. In the current
validation system, the roles that the intermediate entities
should play are not clearly deZned. Any intermediate entity
has the right to execute one or more of the obligations of
web users. For example, Firefox has selected to achieve the
four tasks whereas Google Chrome achieves only tasks 3
(partially) and 4. If one web user uses Google Chrome on
two direrent platforms (e.g., Windows and Linux) (s)he may
get direrent validation results for the same website because
the trust list of Windows is not the same as Linux. On the
other side, if one web user uses Firefox and Google Chrome
on the same platform (e.g., Windows) (s)he may get also two
direrent validation results for the same website because the
trust list of Mozilla is not the same as Windows.
Qe 4-cornered trust model solves the aforementioned
problems by creating a physical relation between the RP and
the TB, who is a technical and legal expert in the domain
of PKI. RPs (web users) need only one certiZcate, which is
the public key certiZcate of the TB. Instead thus of having to
observe the integrity of inZnite trust lists, RPs need only to
observe the integrity of one public key certiZcate, regardless
of the nature and number of platforms and applications used
by them.
With the 4-cornered trust model, whenever a user gets
a new platform, (s)he should link their platform to the
validation service proposed by the TB with whom the user
has a contract. It should be possible to choose from a set
of available TBs. ConZguring the TB consists only in setting
the URL and the certiZcate of the TB service. Any so`ware
installed on the platform of the user must use the selected
validation service. Qe OSs have to remove the ability of
so`ware to realize validation services, especially when a user
selects a TB.
With 4-cornered validation system, the web browsers are
completely neutralized. Qe only task that they should make
is to forward the certiZcate of the website to the TB client.
Qus, if the web user has chosen an unknown web browser
to surf the web, this will not arect the security of his TLS
transactions (Figure 17(b)).
In real scenarios, the TB might be misconZgured or has
poor so`ware. Qis will not cause problems for the web
users because the web user is insured by the TB for any
loss or damage (s)he may surer. Qerefore, the user does
not lose out if the TB makes a mistake for any reason. Qis
is not the case for a misconZgured CA trust list, where
the user does lose out. Qe only way to compromise the
security of user’s transactions is to misconZgure the TB
setting. Qis can be easily protected. For example, the X.509
V3 certiZcate has an extensions section that allows adding
additional information to X.509 certiZcate. Consequently, TB
may include a new extension in its certiZcate that contains
the URL of its validation service. During each request, the
TB client shall compare the requested URL with the one
contained in the certiZcate of the TB. Qe advantage of our
proposal is that each user is linked to only one TB and not to
multiple TBs. It is a fundamental improvement of the PKI’s
trust model that has been adopted in the newX.509 standard.
In addition, multiple implementations might be proposed
by direrent TBs. Qis is good from a security perspective.
If one implementation is used by all TBs, one |aw in this
implementation means that all TBs are |awed.
7. Conclusion and Future Works
Qe original X.509 trust model is only appropriate for the
closed deployment model of PKIs, in which the RPs and
subjects both have predeZned relations with the CAs. It is not
appropriate for the open deploymentmodel where the RP has
no explicit relationship with any CA.
Qe existing trust approaches are not adapted to the
needs of RPs to make informed decisions in the PKI open
deployment model. As a result, PKIs remain isolated islands
in the open model. Each PKI seeks to comply only with the
requirements of the jurisdictionwhere the premises of its root
CA are located.Qus, the RPs have to handle this PKI (lack of)
interoperability issue. Qe various harmonization attempts
at regional and international level have not come up with a
solution to the PKI interoperability problem.
PKI trust management is extremely complex; therefore
only technical and legal experts can perform it. It is not
conceivable to delegate this task to the RPs who generally
are “normal” people. Qus, X.509 has deZned a new entity
in its upcoming trust model, called the Trust Broker (TB),
who is a technical and juridical expert. Qis new approach to
trust management is applicable to both the closed and open
deployment models of PKI. We have deZned six criteria for
trust evaluation that this approach should follow.
Contrary to the 3-cornered trust model, the applicability
of the 4-cornered model does not depend on the good
practices of the CAs and their certiZcate holders. Qe TB
varies its scores about the CAs, according to their com-
mitments to their policies and to their commitments for
ensuring that their certiZcate holders remain responsible or
take appropriate actions in case of malpractice.
Based on these six criteria, we have proposed a trust
calculation model, which identiZes and quantiZes the quality
of certiZcates. Qis quality information is represented by a
score between 0 and 1 indicating the quality of the certiZcate
(CLoA). Qis is computed from the quality of the CA’s
procedures (QoCPS), the ability of the CA to conform to
its published procedures, and a conZdence level between 0
and 1 indicating the reliability of the quality calculation and
other information that depends on the context of use of the
certiZcate. To calculate the values of CLoA we have proposed
the following:
(i) To transform policy documents (CP/CPS) into a
format that can be understood by computers since the
natural language used to describe the policy of a CA
is one of the main obstacles to determining trust in a
CA
(ii) Based on RFC 3647, we have structured CP/CPS
documents as a hierarchical tree composed of nodes
and leaves
(iii) To integrate the role of RPs, certiZcate holders, and
competitor TB services to supplement the work of
audit agencies in evaluating the real practices of CAs
(iv) To calculate the quality of CAs (QoCA) based on the
REGRET model, while allowing TBs the |exibility to
incorporate their own intellectual property in order
to gain competitive advantage over other TBs
Qe trust relationship between the RP clients of a TB service
and the TB is an important issue. We propose that it
should be a contractual relationship that gives warranties and
commitments to the RP clients. Qe trust that a client must
have in its TB should not be based on the evaluation strategy
adopted by the TB. Chadwick and Basden [35] has showed
that even PKI experts cannot reach a consensus about the
importance of a CA’s security parameters. As a consequence,
the RP’s trust should be that the contracted TB will make its
best erorts to protect them, but if something goes wrong, the
warranties of the signed contract will erectively alleviate the
problem.
Finally, we have chosen to implement a prototype system
in the context of theweb to showhow Internet users canmake
informed decisions about web server certiZcates, aided by a
TB, without compromising their privacy.
In the short-term, we propose to conduct some usability
experiments to measure the advantages that our prototype
orers to end users.
In the long-term, further work must be conducted to
enrich the assurance information presented to users. Qe
CLoA information is important but not suhcient to give the
overall assurance level for a transaction. Qe provision of
assurance services requires the intervention of other entities
whose natures and roles depend on the context of a trans-
action between the interested parties. For example, attribute
authorities may be required to assure end users that the
services do possess certain attributes.Qe role of these entities
can be extended according to the context of a transaction.
We need to extend this work to deal with all elements of the
chain of a transaction. Each element, depending on its role,
mustmeet certain criteria.Qus, instead of providing only the
CLoA score, the system could provide a score including the
level of quality of all elements of the chain.
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